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Notes
Neither Here nor There:
The Bisexual Struggle for American Asylum
JACLYN GROSS*
Recently, it has become increasingly difficult for foreign nationals to successfully gain
refuge in the United States from persecution in their home countries. The year 1990
marked the first time that the United States granted asylum to a homosexual claimant
on the grounds of membership in a “particular social group.” Since then, several
LGBTI asylum seekers have been granted the right to build new lives in the United
States. Most recently, the country has increasingly included the transgender
community in this group of fortunate individuals. Bisexuals, however, despite
comprising over fifty percent of the LGBTI population, continue to be a significant
subset of the community that consistently faces the most difficulty in attaining asylum
in the United States. Asylum seekers who are discriminated against based on visible
traits face far fewer roadblocks than those attempting to prove persecution for not
being heterosexual.
There are fundamental societal misunderstandings about bisexuality and its presence
in everyday life, and the judiciary suffers from a lack of targeted training that could
help overcome this deficiency. Accordingly, the judiciary must take steps to prevent
these deficiencies from resulting in stereotypes and inaccurate credibility
determinations that may ultimately act as a bar to asylum. This Note proposes that
all judges making asylum determinations be subject to a training program
comparable to that of the LGBTI-specific module required by United States
Citizenship and Immigration Services for Refugee, Asylum and International
Operations officials. With this training, the personal biases of decisionmakers that
lead to skepticism of a claimant’s credibility can be reduced, thus avoiding
miscategorizations of individuals who stray from perceived gender or sexual binaries.

* J.D. Candidate 2018, University of California, Hastings College of the Law; B.A. 2007, University of
California, Santa Cruz. I want to thank Heron Greenesmith for alerting me to the intricacies of this issue and
for her indispensable feedback. I also want to express my gratitude to Professor Dorit Reiss and Karen
Musalo for their time and guidance. This Note is dedicated to all the family and friends who have loved and
supported me unconditionally throughout my journey in law school.
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INTRODUCTION
In the early 1900s, “non-heterosexuals” were denied entry into the
United States because they were seen as “constitutional psychopathic
inferiors.”1 In 1979, the United States Surgeon General directed the
Public Health Service to cease its practice of excluding homosexual
immigrants, but the Assistant Attorney General upheld the ban.2 At that
point, asylum seekers who admitted to having sexual relations with both
genders were put in the same category as homosexuals and denied
protections.3 It was not until 1990 that the United States granted asylum
to sexual minorities on account of sexual orientation being an immutable
trait that made them eligible for protection as “members of a particular
social group.”4 From there, the challenge facing bisexual individuals went
from an outdated view of being “too gay” to enter the country, to needing
to prove they are “gay enough” to be granted asylum.5 As discussed later,
there are a multitude of asylum cases demonstrating the personal biases
or a fundamental misunderstanding of sexual orientation present in
judges’ rulings.

1. Ray Sin, Does Sexual Fluidity Challenge Sexual Binaries? The Case of Bisexual Immigrants
from 1967–2012, 18 SEXUALITIES 413, 416 (2015).
2. Id. at 418.
3. Id. at 426.
4. See Toboso-Alfonso, 20 I. & N. Dec. 819 (B.I.A. 1990); Acosta, 19 I. & N. Dec. 211 (B.I.A. 1985).
5. Sin, supra note 1, at 429.
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Today, the American LGBTI6 community has witnessed a
progression in its legal protections.7 However, these anti-discrimination
laws apply to those who are already legally in the United States, while
LGBTI asylum seekers must satisfy a heavy burden of proof to be granted
relief. While it will always be necessary for Asylum Officers and
Immigration Judges to vet one’s credibility in sexual minority asylum
cases, considerable work still remains insofar as bisexual claimants are
concerned. Some bisexual asylum seekers feel the need to identify as gay
or lesbian during the asylum process, for fear that their application will
be denied if they continue to identify as bisexual.8 Should they
subsequently want to get married to a United States citizen of the
opposite sex, however, they could potentially face removal for
committing fraud on their application.9 This, too, demonstrates the idea
that someone can be told they are not “gay enough” to be granted asylum
by the United States.10

6. Sexual minorities are perceived through several lenses and the pertinent vocabulary in these
discussions can manifest itself in many different forms. Each use has its own meaning and relevance
depending on the larger scope of the discussion. The most common acronym is LGBT (Lesbian, Gay,
Bisexual, Transgender), but it has recently been expanded to include individuals who are “questioning”
or “queer” (LGBTQ) and “intersex” (LGBTI), among others. For the purposes of this Note, the
community is addressed as LGBTI, the acronym now being employed by both the United Nations High
Commissioner for Refugees as well as the United States Citizenship and Immigration Services training
directorate for Refugee, Asylum and International Operations officers. See Maks Levin, UNHCR Leads
in LGBTI Refugee, Asylum Seeker Protection, UNHCR (Dec. 24, 2015), http://www.unhcr.org/
afr/news/latest/2015/12/567bb2869/unhcr-leads-in-lgbti-refugee-asylum-seeker-protection.html;
U.S. CITIZENSHIP & IMMIGRATION SERVS., RAIO DIRECTORATE, GUIDANCE FOR ADJUDICATING LESBIAN,
GAY, BISEXUAL, TRANSGENDER, AND INTERSEX (LGBTI) REFUGEE AND ASYLUM CLAIMS (2011).
As sexual orientation and gender identity become more understood as fluid rather than binary,
it can be difficult for some to keep up with the ever-changing terminology. One of the most inclusive
definitions for sexual orientations that would historically be labeled simply as “bisexual” states that
“the term b+ [is] an umbrella term for people who have the potential for sexual, emotional, and/or
romantic attraction to more than one gender. This includes people who may identify as bisexual,
pansexual, fluid, queer, and questioning as well as people who do not but whose emotions, desires
and/or actions have the capacity to occur across more than one point along the gender spectrum.”
Heron Greenesmith, Happy #BiWeek!, LGBTQ COMMUNITY LIAISON, CITY OF SOMERVILLE (Sept. 21,
2015, 12:01 AM), http://somervillelgbtq.blogspot.com. However, this Note uses “bisexual” when
referring to b+ individuals in order to remain consistent with the term used most throughout the
articles and cases referenced herein, as well as to suggest an expansion of the original term’s
application.
Additionally, when not discussing a specific person whose gender identity is known, this Note
refers to individuals with variations of the pronoun “them,” rather than as “he” or “she,” out of respect
for persons of nonbinary, unspecified, and unknown social gender.
7. See generally Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584 (2015); Windsor v. United States, 699
F.3d 169 (2d Cir. 2012), aff’d, 133 S. Ct. 2675 (2013); Employment Non-Discrimination Act of 2013,
H.R. 1755, 113th Cong. (2013); Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558 (2003).
8. Interview with Okan Sengun, LGBT Coordinator and San Francisco Asylum Office Liaison
of Am. Immigration Lawyers Ass’n, N. Cal. Chapter, in San Francisco, Cal. (Sept. 9, 2016).
9. Id.
10. Sin, supra note 1, at 429.
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Current asylum laws cover persecuted bisexual persons in the same
manner as they cover other persecuted groups. Unfortunately, the
interpretation and administration of these laws can be skewed by the
immigration officials’ perceptions of claimants. Part I of this Note
explains the basics of the United States asylum process and the history of
recent immigration reform. Part II introduces the difficulties that sexual
minorities face when adjudicating asylum claims and then further
delineates issues specific to bisexual asylum seekers. Part III explores
how the legal and social views of immutability have changed, and
continue to change. Finally, Part IV offers recommendations on how to
reconcile existing precedent with changing perspectives. Specifically, this
Part suggests both introducing legislation mandating continued training
for immigration judges and setting a precedent that updates the legal
meaning of “immutability.”
I. THE ASYLUM PROCESS
A. OVERVIEW
Pursuant to United States statute and the United Nations High
Commissioner for Refugees (“UNHCR”) Convention and Protocol
Relating to the Status of Refugees, a “refugee” is defined as:
“[A]ny person who is outside any country of such person’s
nationality . . . and who is unable or unwilling to return to, and is
unable or unwilling to avail himself or herself of the protection of, that
country because of persecution or a well-founded fear of persecution
on account of race, religion, nationality, membership in a particular
social group, or political opinion.”11

The burden of proof falls on the claimant, requiring them to prove
that they meet the definition of refugee by way of persecution for one of
the aforementioned reasons.12 The asylum seeker does not enjoy a
presumption of credibility for their testimony or evidence.13 Only if the
judge does not make an explicitly adverse finding will the individual have
a rebuttable presumption of credibility on appeal.14
The United States immigration system provides two routes to
refugee status: affirmative applications and defensive applications.15 The
affirmative process begins with an asylum seeker who is physically in the
United States submitting the appropriate forms to the United States
11. 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(42) (2012); see also United Nations High Comm’r for Refugees, United
Nations Convention and Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugees 14 (Oct. 4, 1967).
12. 8 U.S.C. § 1158(b)(1)(B) (2012).
13. Id.
14. Id.
15. See Obtaining Asylum in the United States, U.S. CITIZENSHIP & IMMIGR. SERVS.,
https://www.uscis.gov/humanitarian/refugees-asylum/asylum/obtaining-asylum-united-states (last
visited Mar. 3, 2018).
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Citizenship and Immigration Services (“USCIS”), complying with other
formalities such as fingerprinting and background checks, and being
interviewed by an Asylum Officer.16 If the Asylum Officer denies an
affirmative application, the Department of Homeland Security (“DHS”)
issues a Notice to Appear, removal proceedings are triggered, and the
person’s case is referred for a de novo review to an Immigration Judge at
the Executive Office for Immigration Review (“EOIR”).17 The alternate
scenario is the defensive process, which occurs when DHS begins
removal proceedings after apprehending an individual who is already
present in or attempting to enter the United States without proper legal
documentation.18 An individual who is apprehended in such a manner
can petition for asylum as a defense against removal from the United
States.19 At this point, the two processes converge as the asylum seeker
attempts to convince the Immigration Judge to grant them permission to
remain in the United States.20
If the Immigration Judge does not grant asylum, or if the
government chooses to contest a favorable decision, the case can be
appealed to the Board of Immigration Appeals (“BIA”).21 The BIA
typically does a “paper review” of the case, as opposed to hearing
courtroom testimony, and makes a determination based on the
information transferred from the Immigration Court.22 From there, BIA
decisions may be eligible for review in a federal Court of Appeals.23
Except in rare cases where the Supreme Court grants certiorari, Courts
of Appeals are the final review available, and their decisions determine
whether the asylum seeker is permanently removed or if the case will be
remanded back down to the BIA.24
The following graph illustrates the process for both affirmative and
defensive applicants once DHS initiates the removal proceedings
process:

16. See id.
17. Id.
18. Id.
19. Id.
20. Id.
21. See U.S. DEP’T. OF JUSTICE, EXEC. OFFICE OF IMMIGRATION REVIEW, Board of Immigration
Appeals, https://www.justice.gov/eoir/board-of-immigration-appeals (last visited Mar.3, 2018).
22. Id.
23. Id.
24. Flow Chart: Steps in the Asylum Process, NAT’L IMMIGRANT JUST. CTR.,
http://www.immigrantjustice.org/sites/immigrantjustice.org/files/Asylum%20Flow%20Chart.pdf
(last visited Mar. 3, 2018).
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B. MEMBERSHIP IN A PARTICULAR SOCIAL GROUP
Membership in a particular social group can be the means of
granting asylum to individuals who do not fit one of the other four
grounds available.25 The UNHCR directs decisionmakers in cases
pertaining to social group claims to consider whether the group as
asserted “is defined: (1) by an innate, unchangeable characteristic, (2) by
a past temporary or voluntary status that is unchangeable because of its
historical permanence, or (3) by a characteristic or association that is so
fundamental to human dignity that group members should not be
compelled to forsake it.”26 The same guidelines make clear that courts
have previously concluded that women, homosexuals, and families are
examples of accepted social groups for the purposes of granting asylum.27
In 1985, the BIA’s decision in Matter of Acosta defined a “particular
social group” as individuals who share a “common characteristic . . . that
defines the group, [and] must be one that the members of the group
either cannot change, or should not be required to change because it is
fundamental to their individual identities or consciences.”28 With this
decision, the court held that persecution of social groups was comparable
25. 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(42) (2012).
26. U.N. High Comm’r for Refugees, Guidelines on International Protection: “Membership of a
Particular Social Group” Within the Context of Article 1(A)(2) of the 1951 Convention and/or Its 1967
Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugees, U.N. Doc. HCR/GIP/02/02, at 3 (May 7, 2002).
27. Id. Note that the use of the word “homosexual” in these Guidelines predates the UNCHR and
the U.S. government’s updates that now provide immigration adjudicators with more inclusive
terminology.
28. Acosta, 19 I. & N. Dec. 211, 233 (B.I.A. 1985).
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to the other four grounds for asylum under the Immigration and
Nationality Act.29 The court’s subsequent ruling in Matter of TobosoAlfonso expanded membership in a particular social group to include
homosexual claimants.30 In Toboso-Alfonso, a Cuban national testified
that the “[g]overnment register[ed] and maintain[ed] files on all
homosexuals” and that he was brought in every few months for hearings
that involved a physical examination and questions about his sexual
relationships.31 He was often detained without being charged, sent to a
forced labor camp for two months, and harassed by his neighbors.32 The
United States Immigration and Naturalization Service (“INS”), one of the
DHS’s predecessor agencies, argued that Toboso-Alfonso was not a
member of a particular social group, but did not challenge the
Immigration Judge’s finding that homosexuality is an immutable trait.33
Without any evidence to the contrary, the BIA ruled against the INS’s
assertion that Toboso-Alfonso did not satisfy the criteria for membership
in a particular social group and instead, granted his petition for asylum.34
Ten years after the Toboso-Alfonso decision, the Ninth Circuit heard
Hernandez-Montiel v. INS, which involved a gay Mexican man with a
female sexual identity.35 The court considered whether, for asylum
purposes, variations of sexual minorities could also be considered a
particular social group.36 Ultimately, the court determined that he did
satisfy the social group requirement, and that he had a well-founded fear
of persecution if he were to be sent back to Mexico.37
Citing Toboso-Alfonso, the Ninth Circuit’s subsequent decision in
Karouni v. Gonzales cemented the idea that “all alien homosexuals are
members of a ‘particular social group.’”38 Karouni was a Lebanese man
seeking asylum because he feared that, if removed back to Lebanon, he
would face persecution for being homosexual, suffering from AIDS, and
being Shi’ite.39 United States Attorney General Alberto Gonzales, in
deciding against asylum for the petitioner, argued that the Lebanese
government did not arrest someone for merely being “homosexual,” but
rather because they had engaged in “homosexual conduct.”40 The court
disagreed and said that if Karouni had already engaged in such acts, or if
the government believed him to have done so, he could be persecuted for
29.
30.
31.
32.
33.
34.
35.
36.
37.
38.
39.
40.

Id.
Toboso-Alfonso, 20 I. & N. Dec. 819 (B.I.A. 1990).
Id. at 820–21.
Id. at 821.
Id. at 822.
Id.
Hernandez-Montiel v. I.N.S., 225 F.3d 1084 (9th Cir. 2000).
See id. at 1087, 1093.
Id. at 1099.
Karouni v. Gonzales, 399 F.3d 1163, 1172 (9th Cir. 2005).
Id. at 1166.
Id. at 1172.

GROSS-69.3.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE)

992

4/6/2018 4:05 PM

HASTINGS LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 69:985

it regardless of his future actions.41 The Ninth Circuit also reiterated an
earlier ruling stating that “even a ten percent chance that the applicant
will be persecuted in the future is enough to establish eligibility for
asylum.”42 The court characterized the Attorney General’s argument as
akin to telling Karouni that he would have to change a fundamental trait
and “forsake the intimate contact and enduring personal bond” protected
by the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.43 This decision
indicated that Karouni was entitled to the same fundamental right to
intimate contact as seen in non-asylum related LGBTI legal victories.44
Further, the court refused to adopt a distinction between homosexual
identity and homosexual conduct when it came to indicators of an
immutable trait for the purpose of establishing membership in a
particular social group.45
In 2002, the UNHCR released guidelines on social group claims in
an attempt to reconcile a “protected characteristics”or
“immutability”approach with a “social perception approach.”46 The
guidelines characterized a “particular social group” as a “group of
persons who share a common characteristic that is often innate or
otherwise fundamental, or who are perceived as a group by society.”47
The disjunctive nature of the word “or” indicates a desire to show that
both social perception and immutability are relevant factors; either is
sufficient to satisfy the characterization. This conclusion is further
supported by the statement that “[i]f a claimant alleges a social group
that is based on a characteristic determined to be neither unalterable or
fundamental, further analysis should be undertaken to determine
whether the group is nonetheless perceived as a cognizable group in that
society.”48 The guidelines also provide that, while persecution alone
cannot determine a “particular social group,” it can be evidence of an
inference that the individuals are visible to society as a recognizable
social group.49
C. IMMIGRATION APPEALS REFORM
In 2002, United States Attorney General John Ashcroft
implemented a plan to streamline the immigration appeals process.50
41.
42.
43.
44.
45.

Id.
Id. (quoting El Himri v. Ashcroft, 378 F.3d 932, 936 (9th Cir. 2004)).
Karouni, 399 F.3d at 1173.
See Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 577; United States v. Marcum, 60 M.J. 198, 208 (2004).
KAREN MUSALO ET AL., REFUGEE LAW AND POLICY: A COMPARATIVE AND INTERNATIONAL
APPROACH 668 (4th ed. 2011).
46. U.N. High Comm’r for Refugees, supra note 26, at 3.
47. U.N. High Comm’r for Refugees, supra note 26, at 3 (emphasis added).
48. U.N. High Comm’r for Refugees, supra note 26, at 4.
49. U.N. High Comm’r for Refugees, supra note 26, at 4.
50. Press Release, Exec. Office for Immigration Review, U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Attorney General
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Among the changes made, the BIA was reduced from twenty-three
members down to eleven, new time constraints for appeals were
imposed, and the standard of review changed from de novo to “clearly
erroneous.”51 A study conducted after the restructuring revealed that the
judges with the highest percentage of rulings in favor of non-citizens
were the ones removed from the Board.52 In turn, critics called the result
of Ashcroft’s actions a “purge of dedicated civil servants based on a
perception of their policy views.”53
While Ashcroft’s plan may have reduced backlog at the BIA level, it
led to drastic increases in anti-immigrant decisions and, consequently,
an exponential increase in the number of federal circuit court appeals.54
In 2001, before the restructuring, immigration cases accounted for 3% of
all federal appeals cases, with 59% of rulings going against immigrants.55
In 2002, the number of rulings against immigrants drastically increased
to 86%.56 By 2005, immigration cases accounted for 17% of all federal
appeals cases.57 A study examining 76,000 rulings by the BIA between
1998 and 2005 found that asylum applicants who were represented by an
attorney were awarded favorable appeals in 43% of cases in 2001, but by
2005 were only winning 13% of appeals.58 Presently, the number of BIA
members is up to twenty members, four of whom are listed as temporary
members.59
Shortly after Ashcroft’s reform, complaints arose about the
treatment of litigants by the judges, namely biases being vocalized in
Issues Final Rule Reforming Board of Immigration Appeals Procedures (Aug. 23, 2002),
https://www.justice.gov/sites/default/files/eoir/legacy/2002/08/26/BIARestruct.pdf.
51. Id.
52. Peter J. Levinson, The Facade of Quasi-Judicial Independence in Immigration Appellate
Adjudications, 9 BENDER’S IMMIGR. BULL. 1154, 1163 (2004).
53. Ricardo Alonso-Zaldivar & Jonathan Peterson, 5 on Immigration Board Asked to Leave;
Critics Call It a Purge, L.A. TIMES (Mar. 12, 2003), http://articles.latimes.com/2003/mar/12/nation/
na-immig12.
54. Stephen H. Legomsky, Restructuring Immigration Adjudication, 59 DUKE L.J. 1635, 1669
(2010); Lisa Getter & Jonathan Peterson, Speedier Rate of Deportation Rulings Assailed, LOS
ANGELES TIMES (Jan. 5, 2003), http://articles.latimes.com/2003/jan/05/nation/na-immig5 (the
backlog in BIA cases dropped from 56,000 to 32,000 by 2004 while Courts of Appeal simultaneously
saw a drastic increase in appeals of BIA decisions).
55. Getter & Peterson, supra note 54; Adam Liptak, Courts Criticize Judges’ Handling of Asylum
Cases: Pattern of Bias Alleged, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 26, 2005, at A1.
56. Getter & Peterson, supra note 54.
57. Getter & Peterson, supra note 54; Liptak, supra note 55.
58. Julia Preston, Big Disparities in Judging of Asylum Cases, N.Y. TIMES (May. 31, 2007),
http://www.nytimes.com/2007/05/31/washington/31asylum.html.
59. Board of Immigration Appeals, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, EXEC. OFFICE FOR IMMIGRATION
REVIEW, www.justice.gov/eoir/board-of-immigration-appeals-bios (last visited Mar. 3, 2018).
However, as recently as 2015, the Department of Justice (“DOJ”) was still attempting to deal with a
backlog of immigration cases, which it claims is due to a shortage of Immigration Judges. Oversight
of the Executive Office for Immigration Review: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Immigration. and
Border Security of the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 114th Cong. 2 (2015) (statement of Juan P. Osuna,
Dir., Exec. Office. for Immigration Review, U.S. Dep’t of Justice).
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court.60 Vocal biases are especially troubling in cases where the
immigrant is of a background or culture not fully understood by the
person deciding their asylum status. These prejudicial predispositions in
rulings can adversely affect individuals’ pleas for asylum. Further, the
federal appeals judges noticed that the quality of review coming from the
Immigration Judges was suffering as they attempted to cut through more
cases with fewer judges.61 Judge Posner wrote that the federal courts
were receiving “either no opinion or . . . very short, unhelpful boilerplate
opinion[s]” from Immigration Judges, making it difficult for federal
appeals judges to give an informed review of the facts.62
Today, this lack of information still hinders the government’s ability
to determine which BIA judges fully comprehend the types of issues
presented by the individuals seeking asylum from persecution faced in
their native countries. Without an understanding of how or why the
judges come to the conclusions that they do, it is difficult to determine
whether they are biased or just underinformed.
II. DIFFICULTIES IN SEXUAL MINORITY ASYLUM CLAIMS
A. ROLES OF ASYLUM OFFICERS AND IMMIGRATION JUDGES
Given the relatively new recognition of sexual minorities as
legitimate members of a “particular social group,” it is not surprising that
these individuals still face Asylum Officers and judges at every level who
do not know how to properly evaluate their claims. Individuals who are
discriminated against for more visible traits, such as race, must prove
they have a “well-founded fear of persecution” upon returning to their
country of origin to be granted asylum.63 Meanwhile, sexual minorities
have the added burden of also proving that they are, in fact, even part of
the asserted social group. Personal biases on the part of decisionmakers
can lead to skepticism of a claimant’s credibility, and lack of knowledge
can lead to a miscategorization of a person who strays from perceived
gender or sexual binaries.
All United States Asylum Officers are required to complete the
five-and-a-half-week Asylum Officer Basic Training Course.64 It focuses
solely on educating officers on how to proceed during asylum
adjudications.65 In addition, the Asylum Division requires that weekly
training sessions be conducted in each of the field offices on various
60. Liptak, supra note 55.
61. Liptak, supra note 55.
62. Liptak, supra note 55.
63. 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(42) (2012).
64. See Asylum Division Training Programs, U.S. CITIZENSHIP & IMMIGR. SERVS.,
https://www.uscis.gov/humanitarian/refugees-asylum/asylum/asylum-division-training-programs
(last visited Mar. 3, 2018).
65. Id.
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topics that are determined by supervisors to best address the needs of
each particular site.66 A 2012 update to the Refugee, Asylum and
International Operations (“RAIO”) training directorate offers an LGBTIspecific module that includes definitions of central terms and relevant
case law.67 Additionally, the training offers guidance on asking sensitive
questions that garner necessary testimony, and distinguishes between
factors judges should or should not allow to sway their final
determinations.68
Immigration Judges are appointed by the Attorney General to sit as
an administrative judge within the EOIR.69 The attorneys then undergo
a total of six weeks of training within the first year after their
appointment, the initial five weeks being consecutive and the final week
occurring after they have heard cases for six to twelve months.70 This
training includes classroom education and shadowing established
Immigration Judges with a focus on the laws and procedures central to
adjudicating immigration cases.71 No LGBTI related terminology appears
in any of the EOIR’s Immigration Court or BIA Practice Manuals, and the
term “social group” is only included in the Immigration Court manual
once as part of the definition for “reasonable fear standard.”72 As judges
in the Immigration Court or on the BIA, these individuals are responsible
for exercising independent judgment on all immigration cases, not just
in reference to asylum.73 Accordingly, these Practice Manuals deal
entirely with the rules of the judicial process overall, rather than
addressing how to approach any specific substantive immigration
issues.74
Logically speaking, the more targeted training that Asylum Officers
receive, the better equipped they would be to question asylum seekers
and make determinations about the legitimacy and necessity of each
claim. Unfortunately, as of 2017, there is not much data on whether the
2012 updates have affected the number of LGBTI asylum cases being
appealed. One explanation for this is that many asylum cases are
66. Id.
67. See U.S. CITIZENSHIP & IMMIGRATION SERVS., supra note 6.
68. See U.S. CITIZENSHIP & IMMIGRATION SERVS., supra note 6.
69. 8 U.S.C. § 1101(b)(4) (2011).
70. See U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, EXEC. OFFICE FOR IMMIGR. REVIEW, FACT SHEET: IMMIGRATION
JUDGE TRAINING (2016).
71. Id.
72. See generally U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, EXEC. OFFICE FOR IMMIGRATION REVIEW, THE
IMMIGRATION COURT PRACTICE MANUAL (2009), https://www.justice.gov/eoir/pages/attachments/
2015/02/02/practice_manual_review.pdf; BOARD OF IMMIGRATION APPEALS PRACTICE MANUAL, EXEC.
OFFICE OF IMMIGRATION REVIEW, https://www.justice.gov/sites/default/files/pages/attachments/
2017/02/03/biapracticemanualfy2017.pdf (last visited Mar. 3, 2018).
73. U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, supra note 72; BOARD OF IMMIGRATION APPEALS PRACTICE MANUAL,
supra note 72.
74. See U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, supra note 72.
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ultimately sealed. Another may be a combination of the length of time
immigration appeals take and the fact that this directorate was
introduced just five years ago. Immigration Court and BIA judges may
have a fair amount of immigration law experience before being
appointed, but they are not offered training akin to that received by
Asylum Officers. Federal appeals judges have extensive experience on the
bench, but they run the risk of being even further removed from the
issues facing potential refugees. Without specified training, judges’
familiarity with asylum issues likely lies in the types of cases they have
already presided over. This may mean they are underinformed when it
comes to making decisions on whether to reverse or uphold decisions by
immigration officials.
B. JUDICIAL BIAS AND MISUNDERSTANDING
Once a case has entered the referral or removal process, and
depending on how far up the chain it gets appealed, those persons
making status determinations will have varying degrees of separation
from the Asylum Officers who originally heard the case. This leaves each
case open for a judge’s inherent biases or fundamental misunderstanding
of sexual orientation to potentially have a detrimental effect. As
mentioned previously, it is difficult to find records of United States
asylum cases, but some of the published opinions do offer insight into
why judges could benefit from more in-depth training on the nature of
LGBTI claims.
Some decisions indicate that judgments were made by comparing
asylum seekers to stereotypes of the LGBTI community. In 2007,
Albanian native Daniel Shahinaj entered the United States illegally and
applied affirmatively for asylum.75 Following the BIA’s ruling to uphold
the Immigration Judge’s denial, the Eighth Circuit overturned the
agency’s decision and granted Shahinaj’s petition for review. The court’s
reasoning was based in part on “the IJ’s personal and improper opinion
[that] Shahinaj did not dress or speak like or exhibit the mannerisms of
a homosexual.”76 Other circuit court judges have overturned decisions in
which Immigration Judges denied asylum seekers’ claims because the
men were not effeminate or did not otherwise indicate their sexual
orientation via appearance or behavior.77 The Eleventh Circuit, for
example, has remanded a case “for a new factual hearing, free of any
impermissible stereotyping or ungrounded assumptions about how gay
men are supposed to look or act.”78 This indicates that biases and
75. Shahinaj v. Gonzales, 481 F.3d 1027, 1027 (8th Cir. 2007).
76. Id. at 1029.
77. See Razkane v. Holder, 562 F.3d 1283, 1286 (10th Cir. 2009); Todorovic v. U.S. Att’y Gen.,
621 F.3d 1318, 1323 (11th Cir. 2010).
78. Todorovic, 621 F.3d at 1327.
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fundamental misunderstandings of the LGBTI community are not
confined to any one jurisdiction.
C. BI-SPECIFIC ISSUES
The struggles presented in cases involving sexual minorities can be
exacerbated when the asylum seeker is bisexual because the answers to
specific questions regarding sexual history or personal identification may
seem somewhat ambiguous. The questions asked during interviews and
trials seek to determine the degree of persecution the individual
experienced while in their native country.79 In addition to testimony, the
decisionmakers require proof of these claims, but may misinterpret
situations in which claimants show having relationships or sexual contact
with persons of more than one gender.80 If the decisionmaker
misunderstands an asylum seeker’s experiences, it could lead to a
judgment based on the belief that the individual is actually
heterosexual.81
At times, judges’ decisions can also falter in terms of a fundamental,
but subconscious confusion about human sexual orientation, especially
as far as bisexual claimants are concerned. For instance, the Sixth
Circuit’s 2009 decision in Sempagala v. Holder denied a bisexual man
asylum because it determined he could not prove his bisexuality or that
he feared persecution in Uganda.82 The Immigration Judge found that
although Sempagala claimed to be bisexual, he was “able to conceal” his
relationship with a man, was “currently married to a woman and [had]
not engaged in a same-sex relationship since [leaving] Uganda.”83 To
state that someone must be heterosexual because they have been in a
monogamous opposite-sex marriage demonstrates a fundamental
misunderstanding of bisexuality. Further, the idea of being able to hide
his same-sex relationship goes against the idea of granting asylum on the
grounds of a trait that one should not be required to change.
If Sempagala was decided today, the well-founded fear of
persecution prong would be satisfied. However, whether the presiding
judge would find credibility in Sempagala’s sexual orientation claim is
uncertain. The fear of persecution prong not being satisfied at the time of
the decision made the credibility of his bisexual claim less important to
address on appeal. Nonetheless, this demonstrates why continued
training can be crucial to impartiality. Since the Sempagala ruling, there
have been more petitions granted for Ugandan citizens due to increases
79. MOVEMENT ADVANCEMENT PROJECT, INVISIBLE MAJORITY: THE DISPARITIES FACING BISEXUAL
PEOPLE AND HOW TO REMEDY THEM 1, 12 (2016).
80. Id.
81. Id.
82. Sempagala v. Holder, 318 F.App’x 418, 420 (6th Cir. 2009).
83. Id.
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in widespread political persecution and in legislative goals, including a
death penalty for homosexual behavior.84
Judicial rulings to date indicate that decisionmakers still have
trouble separating a judgment of the asylum seeker’s credibility from
their asserted sexual orientation. Ray Fuller, a former native of Jamaica,
testified that he was married to a woman but had sexual relationships
with several individuals, both male and female, from his pre-teen years
until the hearing.85 Fuller presented reports of the criminalization and
torture by police officers of LGBTI persons as evidence of the persecution
faced in Jamaica.86 He also testified to being taunted for being gay and
sliced with a knife, being robbed at gunpoint while being called a
homophobic slur, being shot in the back while at a party with his
boyfriend, and being disowned by his mother and sisters for his sexual
orientation.87 Despite the evidence introduced, the Immigration Judge
found issues with Fuller’s credibility due to inconsistencies between his
documentation and testimony, as well as an inability to get any of his
stated former lovers to testify in person.88 Chief Judge Lisa Wood of the
Seventh Circuit denied Fuller’s appeal, but stated that if he were able to
collect solid evidence to prove that the Immigration Judge erred in his
determination of Fuller’s sexual orientation, he could make a motion to
reopen his case.89
In the dissent, Judge Richard Posner said it came as no surprise that
Fuller was unable to provide further documentation or testimony to
corroborate his sexual orientation because it is unlikely that LGBTI
persons in Jamaica would risk making that information about
themselves public.90 It can be hard for any asylum seeker to get former
lovers to testify or even write letters when they are from a country that is
known to persecute LGBTI persons because they fear outing and
exposing themselves to the consequences.91 Judge Posner added that the
Immigration Judge’s issues with Fuller’s credibility are either
misconstrued or irrelevant to whether he is truly bisexual.92 Further,
while it is more common for asylum seekers to call expert witnesses to
establish their sexual identity, it would be acceptable for the Immigration
Judge to call a psychologist to testify about the reliability of Fuller’s

84. SHARITA GRUBERG & RACHEL WEST, HUMANITARIAN DIPLOMACY: THE U.S. ASYLUM SYSTEM’S
ROLE IN PROTECTING GLOBAL LGBT RIGHTS, CTR. FOR AM. PROGRESS 7 (2015),
https://cdn.americanprogress.org/wp-content/uploads/2015/06/LGBTAsylum-final.pdf.
85. Fuller v. Lynch, 833 F.3d 866, 868 (7th Cir. 2016).
86. Id.
87. Id.
88. Id. at 869–70.
89. Id. at 872.
90. Id. (Posner, J., dissenting).
91. Interview with Okan Sengun, supra note 8.
92. Fuller, 833 F.3d at 873.
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claim. Had such an expert witness been called, then perhaps Chief Judge
Wood could have avoided Judge Posner’s scrutiny regarding her ability
to discern whether the Immigration Judge properly ruled on Fuller’s
sexual orientation. Judge Posner ended by stating that “the weakest part
of the Immigration Judge’s decision is that Fuller is not bisexual, a
conclusion premised on the fact that he’s had sexual relations with
women . . . Apparently the Immigration Judge does not know the
meaning of bisexual.”93
These two cases ended in denial of the claims for reasons that were
stated to be separate from their characterization of sexual minorities.94
However, the appellate decisions for both suggest that the judges at the
Immigration Court level had a fundamental misunderstanding of
bisexuality and the different ways in which it may manifest. This
showcases ways in which continued training focused on LGBTI
individuals may be necessary to ensure fairness in future cases. Up to this
point, by upholding asylum denials on grounds other than sexual
orientation, some courts have avoided the topic altogether.95 It is easier
to say the outcome would have been different when one finds reasons not
to address the core questions. By bringing judicial understanding in line
with current social understandings, courts may better recognize certain
characteristics of a bisexual identity and be prepared to review such cases
appropriately.
The national advocacy organization Immigration Equality compiled
all the LGBTI and HIV asylum cases that reached United States Courts of
Appeals between 1996 and 2012.96 Of over 150 LBGTI cases, only three
were asylum seekers who asserted a bisexual orientation.97 Included in
the heavier burden faced just to prove the legitimacy of their sexual
orientation is a host of unique issues facing the bisexual subgroup.
Bisexual asylum seekers’ petitions are granted at much lower rates
than other sexual minorities,98 which could leave many feeling uneasy
about their chances from the onset. However, if an asylum seeker were to
apply only as gay or lesbian to improve their chances of being granted
asylum, it could cause problems down the road. Should someone claim
to be gay or lesbian to gain asylum and then fall in love with a person of
the opposite gender, the asylee’s green card paperwork could be flagged

93.
94.
95.
96.

Id. at 871.
See Sempagala v. Holder, 318 F.App’x 418, 421–23 (6th Cir. 2009); Fuller, 833 F.3d at 870–72.
Holder, 318 F.App’x at 421–23; Fuller, 833 F.3d at 870–72.
See IMMIGRATION EQUALITY, U.S. COURT OF APPEALS GLBT AND HIV ASYLUM CASES—1996–
PRESENT (current through Oct. 28, 2012), http://www.immigrationequality.org/wp-content/uploads/
2012/12/Final-Circuit-Chart-12-12.pdf.
97. Id.
98. Sean Rehaag, Bisexuals Need Not Apply: A Comparative Appraisal of Refugee Law and
Policy in Canada, the United States, and Australia, 13 INT’L J. OF HUMAN RIGHTS 415, 422 (2009).
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for potential removal on account of a dishonest asylum testimony.99 If
this happens, the asylee would likely be given a chance to explain the
inconsistency,100 but may face trouble proving to a judge that they are
bisexual at all. There is also the potential for a perjury claim, which would
further frustrate an individual’s asylum efforts. This scenario begs the
question of why anyone who is lying about their sexual orientation for
asylum purposes would claim to be bisexual, the subgroup with
historically the lowest success rate, rather than homosexual. An
argument could be made that a single heterosexual person seeking
asylum would want to protect their right to marry later. However, the risk
of being denied asylum outright is likely much higher than the benefits
of that option.
The argument that LGBTI individuals who do not fit a given
stereotype could live as heterosexual to avoid persecution has been
frowned upon in the RAIO directorate.101 This is akin to telling a biracial
individual who can “pass” for a race that is not persecuted in their
country that they should simply live as a member of that group in order
to avoid persecution. However, non-monosexual sexual orientation is not
as widely understood as someone’s ethnicity, and therefore judges in
these cases may have the mindset that it is acceptable to believe that
bisexual persons should consider the option of living a heterosexual
lifestyle at home rather than becoming an asylee. This all infringes on the
“should not be required to change” aspect of the immutability approach.
However, the immigration and appellate courts are constructed to
answer binary questions, and thus attempt to look at every claim as a “yes
or no” question.102 This poses problems for bisexual individuals because
a successful claim requires that judges step outside from a black and
white approach to sexual orientation or gender identity to understand
why those persons satisfy the particular social group requirement. These
cases may depend on proving that past persecution can in part establish
an asylum seeker’s fear of future persecution, because an existing
reputation for being non-heterosexual in their country of origin makes
the ability to appear heterosexual a moot point.103
Another aspect of the asylum process that disproportionately affects
LGBTI applicants is the one-year filing deadline.104 LGBTI persons in
general may be suffering from traumatic effects of sanctioned
persecution in their country of origin and may be afraid to come out to

99. Interview with Okan Sengun, supra note 8.
100. E-mail from Aaron Morris, Exec. Dir., Immigration Equality, to Author (Nov. 13, 2016, 07:08
PST) (on file with Author).
101. U.S. CITIZENSHIP & IMMIGRATION SERVS., supra note 6, at 41.
102. Sin, supra note 1, at 431.
103. Sin, supra note 1, at 431.
104. GRUBERG & WEST, supra note 84, at 23.
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people in any government position.105 One who must disclose to another
person what makes them eligible for asylum (because it may not be
readily apparent) may understandably be apprehensive or distrustful due
to a past riddled with persecution stemming from a third party’s
knowledge of that very attribute. Additionally, an individual who is
fleeing a country for fear of losing their life might not have had the time
or forethought to gather enough evidence to meet the criteria for a
well-founded fear of future persecution (or, in the case of withholding of
removal, a fifty-one percent likelihood of future persecution).106 Finally,
someone from a country that criminalizes or persecutes LGBTI people
may not know that LGBTI status creates a potentially viable claim for
asylum. In short, it may take longer than a year to declare their sexual
orientation or find ways to prove it when they are coming from countries
known to persecute people for nonheterosexuality.107 While this task
could prove difficult for any LGBTI applicant, the heavier, more complex
burden of proof facing bisexuals attempting to convince decisionmakers
who do not understand their sexual identity puts that subgroup at a
disadvantage.
III. CHANGING VIEWS OF IMMUTABILITY
By adapting an equal protection approach,108 the immutability
argument is historically one element of how LGBTI activists have
confronted and overcome oppressive legal barriers.109 Arguing that a
person’s sexual orientation is genetic and unchangeable allows LGBTI
activists to make a persuasive case that the person should not face
discrimination based on that characteristic.110 One legal issue with
immutability claims, however, is that they define sexual orientation by
how someone self-identifies according to attractions, rather than by
same-sex behaviors.111 This can be problematic for fighting laws that
target homosexual conduct, because “the law [does] not target
‘orientation’ . . . only its behavioral manifestations.”112 If a bisexual
individual engages in same-sex relationships, any persecution based on
their orientation is likely much easier to present than that of one who is
not. However, if the claimant has not acted (or acted publicly) on their
self-identified orientation and persecutors are made aware of the
105. GRUBERG & WEST, supra note 84, at 26; see also MOVEMENT ADVANCEMENT PROJECT, supra
note 79, at 1, 12.
106. MOVEMENT ADVANCEMENT PROJECT, supra note 79, at 23.
107. MOVEMENT ADVANCEMENT PROJECT, supra note 79, at 26.
108. See U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
109. Lisa M. Diamond & Clifford J. Rosky, Scrutinizing Immutability: Research of Sexual
Orientation and U.S. Legal Advocacy for Sexual Minorities, 53:4-5 J. OF SEX RES. 364, 365 (2016).
110. Id.
111. Id. at 375.
112. Id. at 365.
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person’s sexual orientation in some other way, it may be harder for the
claimant to prove a well-founded fear.
A major issue when dealing with bisexual asylum seekers is the
concern that claimants are being dishonest about their sexuality to gain
refugee status.113 While there is the potential for people to abuse the
system in this way, a refusal to acknowledge these claims as legitimate
would mean reevaluating how one assesses any non-physical grounds for
asylum. One could easily employ the same deceit with claims based on
religious or political grounds because there often is no natural physical
trait that ties an individual to that particular social group. It would also
be just as hard to prove that someone is lying about their sexuality as it
would be to prove that they are not. This is because many arguments
made to prove one or the other would likely be a viable argument to the
contrary. Not to mention, there is still the fact that bisexual claimants
have the lowest percentage of success of any LGBTI subgroup in asylum
cases and thus would be a risky deceit in the first place.
The idea that gender identity and sexual orientation are immutable
has grounded several landmark legal victories because it is the most
easily explained rationale for granting equal rights.114 This, however, can
present a problem for bisexuals, whose sexual orientation may appear to
be more fluid than someone who is attracted only to people of the same
or different genders. Bisexuality is often referred to as “invisible” in the
legal arena because its complex nature disrupts the binary approach to
sexuality that adjudicators are used to.115 It is easier for courts to make
determinations according to monosexual viewpoints, and thus
stereotyping or inflexibility of interpretations can occur and result in the
denial of asylum petitions.116 While bisexuality might be seen as
disruptive to an immutability argument, bisexuality, as any sexual
orientation, is immutable.117 Thus, the issue seems to lie in how people
define “immutable.”
Bisexual people make up more than fifty-one percent of the LGBTI
population.118 Regarding sexual fluidity, studies have not yielded any
evidence to indicate that persons who see themselves as having an
element of choice in their sexual orientation are less “biologically gay.”119
Although the relationships of some bisexual people may take the form of
113. See Interview with Okan Sengun, supra note 8.
114. See Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584, 2594 (2015); Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677,
686 (1973).
115. Heron Greenesmith, Drawing Bisexuality Back into the Picture: How Bisexuality Fits into
LGBT Legal Strategy Ten Years After Bisexual Erasure, 17 CARDOZO J. OF L. & GENDER 65, 66 (2010); see
also GRUBERG AND WEST, supra note 84; Rehaag supra note 98; Diamond and Rosky supra note 109.
116. Sin, supra note 1, at 431.
117. Greenesmith, supra note 115, at 73.
118. MOVEMENT ADVANCEMENT PROJECT, supra note 79.
119. Diamond & Rosky, supra note 109, at 372.
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both same-sex and opposite-sex partnerships over time, the bisexual
nature of their attractions itself can still be perceived as immutable.120 A
person may have a choice in who their relationships are with, and they
may choose partners of different genders at certain times, but the
capability of being attracted to more than one gender is beyond their
conscious control.121
As early as 1985, the traditional view of immutability was not
perceived as necessary in order for sexual minorities to prevail on an
equal protection claim.122 Rather, the basis for heightened scrutiny could
be grounded in political disenfranchisement and exposure to hostility.123
Judge William Norris of the Ninth Circuit stated that the Supreme
Court’s use of the word “immutable” is not meant to refer to traits that
must be physically impossible to change or conceal.124 Rather, the Court
will consider traits to be immutable if they are “so central to a person’s
identity that it would be abhorrent for government to penalize a person
for refusing to change them, regardless of how easy that change might be
physically.”125 Just as religion, gender, skin color, citizenship, and other
such traits can be perceived incorrectly, so too can sexual orientation.126
The Supreme Court’s approach to immutability was further
broadened in United States v. Windsor, when the Justices upheld the
Second Circuit’s insistence that the test be “whether the characteristic of
the class calls down discrimination when it’s manifest.”127 The Second
Circuit aligned sexual orientation with other classifications that are
evaluated using heightened scrutiny despite them being characteristics
that “do not declare themselves, and often may be disclosed or
suppressed as a matter of preference.”128 While Judge Norris made it
clear that what we consider to be immutable is not necessarily
unchangeable, the court in Windsor went a step further. This ruling
demonstrates a shift away from the perspective that a person must see
the trait as fundamental to their personality and a step toward the
question of whether, upon manifestation, that trait triggers oppression.
The Windsor approach shows progress in both legal and social
understanding of sexuality in such a way that is important for other
LGBTI legal protections as well. The way in which immutability has been
120. Diamond & Rosky, supra note 109, at 370.
121. Diamond & Rosky, supra note 109, at 368.
122. Diamond & Rosky, supra note 109, at 368.
123. Diamond & Rosky, supra note 109, at 374.
124. See Greenesmith, supra note 115, at 76; Watkins v. U.S. Army, 875 F.2d 699, 726 (9th Cir.
1989) (referring to interpretations of the Supreme Court’s use of “immutable”).
125. Watkins, 875 F.2d at 726.
126. Id.
127. United States v. Windsor, 699 F.3d 169, 183 (2d Cir. 2012), aff’d, 133 S. Ct. 2675 (2013).
128. Id. (referencing the Court’s decision in City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Ctr., 473 U.S. 432,
440–41 (1985), in which alienage, illegitimacy, and national origin are among the classifications
subject to heightened scrutiny).
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addressed in the context of defending rights under the Equal Protection
Clause can be applied to immigration law insofar as it presents a judicial
framework for evaluating cases involving LGBTI litigants. There is a
concern that abandoning a determination of whether a trait can be
changed for one that looks at whether a person should be made to change
it will present difficulties for litigants “who do not consider their sexual
orientation to be a fundamental component of their personal identity.”129
However, reframing the question and examining whether the trait plays
a central role in the claimant’s life need not be mutually exclusive.
Perhaps it would help close the gap for decisionmakers who view
bisexuality as having a choice if the scenario was juxtaposed with that of
persecution for religious beliefs. Rather than being viewed solely a choice
of faith, religion may equally be seen as an inherent trait that forms one’s
culture. Similarly, one’s choice of relationship is merely one aspect of a
person’s broader sexual identity. While it is possible to change one’s
religion, it seems unlikely that those who are persecuted for practicing a
certain faith would be denied asylum on the grounds that they could
simply choose to convert to a religion that is more accepted in their
country of origin.
The legal argument that benefits from how the question is phrased
must go together with redefining “immutability” as well. As the definition
moves away from meaning something that cannot change, perhaps the
argument of its being fundamental to one’s identity can also be seen as
incorrectly framed. Instead, moving forward, same-sex attraction should
be seen as a trait that can and may manifest in a person, regardless of
whether that person considers it a central aspect of their identity. It may
simply be a characteristic that exists within them without being
something they acknowledge or fight for each day, but should not render
them undeserving of protection when its manifestation leads to
persecution.
Whether the individual gave much weight to their sexual identity
prior to any same-sex experiences or persecution is less important than
is the existence of a trait at the time a conflict occurred. It might be
central to one’s being in the sense that the potential for same-sex
attraction is a constant, even if it lays dormant at a given time. However,
it does not need to be viewed as something the individual deems
fundamental in the ways we tend to interpret that phrase. Anyone could
potentially manifest a same-sex attraction, and thus fluidity should not
invalidate immutability claims. Put simply, anytime someone manifests
a same-sex attraction or a bisexual identity that elicits discrimination,
that individual should qualify for equal protection.

129. Diamond & Rosky, supra note 109, at 376.
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IV. WHERE DO WE GO FROM HERE?
As discussed, two of the major issues facing bisexual asylum seekers
are: (1) decisionmakers making determinations based on inherent biases
or fundamental misunderstandings of what bisexuality is, and (2) a
definition of “immutable” that does not encompass all sexual identities
equally. Ideally, these two issues should be remedied. It is necessary for
judges at both the immigration and appellate levels to make impartial,
educated decisions about the claims of bisexual individuals.
One means of addressing this issue is by introducing legislation that
mandates that Immigration Judges be given LGBTI-centered training
akin to the RAIO requirements discussed above. This would ensure that
the courts are better prepared to review the initial decisions made by
Asylum Officers. While judges spend years in the legal field before being
appointed to the bench,130 there is no way to ensure that their
understanding and experience are uniformly appropriate. The resulting
risk is that even when Asylum Officers make an informed determination,
judges not working with the same basic knowledge might send people
back to the country in which they feared for their lives. The 2012 RAIO
LGBTI update is more bi-inclusive and attempts to guide the officers
through better procedures for evaluating less common sexual minority
claims.131 Federal judges are required to preside over a plethora of
practice areas, making it more difficult to thoroughly train them on every
potential type of case they may encounter. However, Immigration Judges
are responsible for creating the judicial records later reviewed by the
federal judges when making appellate rulings. Therefore, judges who
work exclusively on immigration matters should be just as well informed
on LGBTI issues as the officers whose decisions they are reviewing. Not
only would this provide more effective review, but detailed and
knowledgeable written opinions may also help cut back the number of
appeals if the reasons for each decision are better articulated. It is
prudent that the Immigration Judges and BIA members who are
reviewing Asylum Officer’s findings ought to be trained with similar
substantive standards in addition to merely learning judicial procedure.
Additionally, immigration courts could benefit from the Supreme
Court setting a precedent that unquestionably determines the legal
outlook on immutability. Of course, there is the danger of the Court
defining immutability in such a way that adds to the difficulties for
LGBTI asylum seekers rather than relieving them. As with many social
justice movements, this possibility can be mitigated by advocates who
remain patient and only bring cases which have the highest likelihood of

130. 8 U.S.C. § 1101(b)(4) (2011) (stating that immigration judges are former attorneys appointed
to the bench by the Attorney General).
131. See U.S. CITIZENSHIP & IMMIGRATION SERVS., supra note 6.
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a favorable ruling. It should be explicitly confirmed through the Court
that the UNHCR intended immutability to be one factor to consider, but
it should be neither the sole basis for determining membership in a
particular social group nor dispositive of credibility. Unfortunately, an
outdated view of immutability seems to guide many immigration
officials’ judgments as they believe bisexual individuals could simply
choose to live a heterosexual lifestyle to avoid persecution. Yet, removing
immutability from the equation altogether could be problematic in the
face of how many civil rights victories have already been won using
arguments with that label. Thus, it would be most beneficial to reframe
the analysis which has excluded certain subgroups and instead employ
the approach that the UNHCR envisioned.
In addition to reducing the impact of the immutability factor, the
Supreme Court is in the position to use previous rulings to redefine what
“immutable” means. To do so consciously and effectively, they must have
accurate factual findings from the lower courts. If Immigration Judges
were required to undergo ongoing training similar to that of the Asylum
Officers, the system as a whole would benefit. Not only would
decisionmakers view asylum seekers through modern eyes that are more
sensitive to a wide array of human situations, but the records they create
for potential appellate use will be written with a deeper understanding of
exactly what merits and shortcomings each asylum seeker offers. Traits
that were once deemed unchangeable may not be so in the present day,
because as society advances, certain characteristics have become more
fluid. By offering judges a broader, more current understanding of how
to define “immutable,” earlier sexual minority legal victories can be
reconciled with more recent rulings that do not see fluid traits as
necessarily being mutable.
Over time, the characteristics that society thinks of as being
immutable have shifted, and the courts’ jurisprudence should reflect this
fact. Gender was at one time considered fundamentally unchangeable,
but that is no longer the case. One’s status as an alien or as an illegitimate
child have both long been legally changeable. In matters of religion, traits
that are technically mutable are seen as being so essential to one’s
identity that they should not be forced to change them. Although the
notion of non-binary identities is still a relatively new concept to
governmental matters, earlier cases laid the groundwork for judicial
determinations to support their legitimacy. The fact that a person’s
sexual orientation or their partners’ gender identity changes over time is
not proof that the asylum claims lack credibility. Similar to the discussion
in Windsor, the focus should be on whether or not their sexuality triggers
persecution when it is manifest. Continuing to build a judicial record of
rulings that supports this idea provides documentation crucial to
influencing how bisexual individuals are perceived. This may affect the
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ways in which they feel comfortable presenting themselves, which then
has the potential to come full circle and inform how judges understand
and evaluate bisexual asylum seekers.
CONCLUSION
Individuals seeking asylum in the United States are clearly held to a
much stricter standard than are LGBTI Americans in terms of what is
required for them to gain the protections offered here. At times, the
government must make tough decisions about who to allow in, with the
well-being of the entire country in mind. This, however, can perpetuate a
subconscious presumption that citizens are telling the truth about their
sexual orientation while the same courtesy is not offered to non-citizen
asylum seekers. To be truly impartial in these determinations, judges
must be knowledgeable about current psychological and social
worldviews of sexual minorities. An individual’s focus on their sexuality
may be solely out of caution for how they present themselves in their
country of origin. The person may not necessarily see sexuality as a core
element of their overall identity, but is forced to be aware of it more than
any other inherent physical or behavioral trait so as not to be persecuted
for it. Accordingly, asylum should not depend on a showing that one’s
sexual orientation is otherwise remarkable.
If the United States legal system cannot adapt its understandings of
people from other cultures, especially in terms of the way LGBTI asylum
cases are handled, then our country’s approach to human rights may be
subject to harsh scrutiny. It shows inconsistencies in our political system
if equal protection claims for sexual minorities are approached
differently than asylum cases because it sends conflicting messages about
which groups the United States deems worthy of legal protections. Under
the “particular social group” umbrella, United States asylum laws are
already written with the intent to protect LGBTI individuals, including
bisexuals. However, the interpretation of these laws regarding bisexual
individuals is often skewed by the existing viewpoints of immigration
officials. The fact that Immigration Judges and the BIA have full
discretion when presiding in asylum cases means the government has an
interest in educating them to avoid inherent biases and negative
stereotyping as much as possible. By intertwining continued LGBTI
sensitivity training and creating a judicial record of how to accurately
define and apply immutability, the views of immigration officials can be
brought in line with current social perspectives. Once immigration
officials understand that neither bisexuality nor sexual fluidity invalidate
an analysis of immutability, advocates for the bisexual community can
begin to shape how our judicial and legislative systems function
regarding bisexual and other non-monosexual asylum seekers.
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